Abstract. With the rapid development of wireless communication technologies, mobile networks will enable users to use personal mobile devices to access various network information services at anytime and anyplace. Recently, Lu et al. proposed a dynamic ID based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) which attempts to support better security properties and resists various well-known security attacks. However, we introduce some design flaws in Lu et al.'s scheme, such as server impersonation attacks by launching stolen-verifier attacks. Besides, their authentication scheme is unable to preserver user anonymity and the performance of authentication and key agreement phase is inefficiency. As a remedy, the main contribution of this study is to design an improved and efficient ECC-based authentication scheme with privacy protection. We analyze its security and performance, proving that our improved scheme not only prevents security weaknesses on Lu et al.'s scheme, but also enhances system efficiency such that it can be implemented to more electronic applications in mobile communication networks.
mobile devices (e.g., smart phones, notebooks tablet computers etc.). More and more mobile services (e.g., online banking, online pay TV, online shopping, online instant messenger etc.) are implemented for a mobile user to access services and resources from a remote server. To gain popularity of mobile services, ensuring user privacy and system security are paramount [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . User privacy assures that a legitimate user involved in various mobile services is not spied by any adversary [21, 23-25, 27, 28] . Furthermore, system security assures that unregistered users cannot fraudulently access mobile services and resources from remote servers [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . As the mobile communication networks are public and insecure by nature, the mobile use and remote server have to verify the authenticity of each other and share a session key to protect the integrity of transmitted messages. Besides, it could damage user privacy when user's real identity is transmitted as a plaintext without any protection in mobile networks. By tracking the user's static identity, an adversary may successfully track his/her current location and recognize what kinds of mobile services the user accesses. To preserve user anonymity in mobile networks, a mobile user cannot be linked or traced by any adversaries and his/her real identity must be masked during the authentication session.
In recent years, in order to safeguard the security from network intrusions, many ID based user authentication and key agreement schemes using elliptic curve cryptography [22, 11] have been proposed. In the year of 2009, Yang and Chang [26] proposed an ECC-based solution to build an mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile devices. However, in the year of 2011, Islam and Biswas [10] pointed out that Yang-Chang's solution is still susceptible to replay attacks, many logged-in users' and clock synchronization problems. Moreover, Yang-Chang's solution did not preserve user anonymity and session key forward secrecy. Islam and Biswas further proposed an improved version of Yang-Chang's scheme and their improved scheme can provide remote server and mobile users with a more secure and efficient Internet applications. Additionally, in the year of 2012, He et al. [4] proposed a new ID-based authentication scheme for mobile client-server environments and their authentication scheme uses general cryptographic hashing functions instead of MapToPoint functions. In the year of 2013, Chou et al. [2] pointed out that He et al.'s solution did not provide explicit key confirmation and the construction of a user's private key is time-consuming because the server needs to perform modular inversion operations. Therefore, Chou et al. further proposed an improved ID-based authenticated scheme with key agreement for mobile environments. However, in the year of 2014, Farash and Attari [3] showed that Chou et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to two kinds of impersonation attacks. In order to remedy these design flaws in Chou et al.'s scheme, Farash and Attari propose a more secure and efficient ID based authenticated key exchange scheme using ECC for mobile client-server environments. Recently, in the year of 2016, Lu et al. [20] present a cryptanalysis on both Chou et al.'s and Farash-Attari's authentication schemes and they found that Farash-Attari's scheme is still susceptible to track and keycompromise impersonation attacks. To achieve security robustness in designing two-party authenticated key exchange scheme, Lu et al. present a simple enhancement on Farash-Attari's scheme, which not only retains the original merits of Farash-Attari's scheme but also resists security flaws for mobile networks.
Although Lu et al.'s ID-based mutual authentication and user anonymity scheme enhanced the security and efficiency of Chou et al.'s and Farash-Attari's schemes. Unfortunately, this study demonstrated that Lu et al.'s scheme has three design weaknesses: 1) the scheme fails to preserve user anonymity by launching eavesdrop attacks, 2) the scheme has stolen-verifier attacks in server side, 3) the scheme has server impersonation attacks when the verifier table of server is compromised by an adversary. Moreover, the performance of Lu et al.'s scheme is inefficiency during authentication and key agreement phase. In order to tackle above-mentioned weaknesses, we suggest a more reliable and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement scheme for protecting user privacy in mobile communication environments. From the experiment result shows, we demonstrate the efficiency of our improved scheme. Furthermore, we prove the robustness of our improved scheme through the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic analysis [1] . Formal security proof shows that our enhanced scheme seems to be more practical for implementation in various mobile services to ensure message confidentiality and user privacy.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides briefly overview of Lu et al.'s and demonstrates its design weaknesses in Section 3. Section 4 presents our improved scheme and proves the security of our scheme by using widely-accepted BAN logic in Section 5 and Section 6. Section 7 gives a detailed experimental comparison between our improved scheme and Lu et al.'s scheme. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 8.
Review of Lu et al.'s Scheme
Lu et al.'s mutual authentication scheme [20] will be briefly reviewed in this section. Lu et al.'s scheme comprises two phases like registration and authentication and key agreement. Some terminologies and notations used throughout this study are listed below:
-U : The user.
-S: The server.
-ID A : The identity of entity A.
The private key and public key of S.
The private key and public key of U .
-P : The point value on the elliptic curve.
-||: The concatenation operation.
-⊕: The XOR operation.
Registration Phase
Before registration, the server S publishes {E(a, b), K S , h 1 (·), h 2 (·)}, where K S = k s P . The details of registration phase are described below:
Step 1: U chooses his/her identity ID U and transmits it to S through a secure channel.
Step 2: S generates a random number r s 1 and calculates
and
Then S stores r s 1 into its secret DB and returns
If it holds, U keeps k U secretly and releases Q ID U .
Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
Step 1: U chooses a random number r u and calculates
Step 2: After receiving {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } from U , S reveals ID U by computing P 1 ⊕ r s 1 P and makes use of (ID U , r s 1 ) to compute K = h 2 (ID U ||r s 1 ) and
and transmits the response message {Q 1 , Q 2 } to U through a public channel, where r s2 is a random number chosen by S.
Step 3: After receiving {Q 1 , Q 2 } from S, U reveals r s 2 P by computing Q 1 ⊕ K and calculates the session key SK = r u r s 2 P . Then U checks if h 2 (K||r u P ||SK ) = Q 2 . If it holds, U calculates the acknowledgement message P 4 = h 2 (K||r s2 P ||SK ) and transmits it to S through a public channel.
Step 4: After receiving {P 4 
holds, S and U successfully achieve mutual authentication and negotiate a common and secure session key SK = SK between them. Figure 1 shows the entire schematic of our enhanced scheme in mobile networks.
Design Weaknesses on Lu et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we show that Lu et al.'s scheme has some design weaknesses, which are described below:
Fail to Ensure User Anonymity
In authentication and key agreement phase of Lu et al.'s scheme, they claimed that the anonymity of every login session from U to S is guaranteed by keeping the secret random number r s 1 . However, in this study, we found that the anonymity property of Lu et al.'s scheme cannot be protected from message Registration Phase:
Authentication and Key Agreement Phase:
Generate rs 2
Calculate SK = r s 2 r u P eavesdropping attacks during the authentication and key agreement phase. Using such a eavesdropping attack, an adversary U A can un-intrusively monitor on the open communication channels between login users and the server and can discover some valuable information about the messages being transmitted over the public channels. Assume that U A eavesdrops all the communication messages transmitted between U and S in mobile networks.
Consider that a user U would like to log into S and transmits the login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } to S to access network services. However, in Step 1 of the authentication and key agreement phase, the login parameter P 1 transmitted from U to S is unchanging in every login session. Thus, the user anonymity will not be ensured even U 's real identity ID U is protected by an alias P 1 = r s1 P ⊕ ID U . In this way, U A can easily trace down the login session from U to S by comparing P 1 with all of the collected messages. For example, if there is a login parameter transmitted between U and S containing P 1 . This means that specific user is involved in a login session. As a result, U A can discover the relation of a connection between U to S as long as the login requests transmitted over the public channels contains P 1 . To prevent this kind of attack, we suggest all the login parameters involved in U 's login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } should be different for each login session.
Suffer from Stolen-Verifier Attacks
In Lu et al.'s scheme, we observe that their scheme may suffer from stolen-verifier attacks. Assume that the verification table is compromised by an adversary U A , then he/she can use it to break the property of user anonymity. The cryptanalysis steps are introduced as follows:
Step 1: U A collects U 's login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } transmitted between U and S by launching eavesdropping attacks.
Step 2: U A makes use of stolen (ID U , r s 1 ) to calculate ID U ⊕ r s 1 P .
Step 3: U A checks if computed ID U ⊕ r s 1 P is equal to P 1 or not. If it holds, U A knows that U is involved in a login session.
From the above steps, we conclude that U A could know U 's identity ID U and Lu et al.'s scheme cannot prevent stolen-verifier attacks.
Suffer from Server Impersonation Attacks
Continued to the Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, once an adversary U A has compromised server's secret database and has learned a login user's identity ID U , he/she could use the stolen (ID U , r s 1 ) to forge a response message to impersonate as a legal server. The cryptanalysis steps are described as follows:
Step 1: U A intercepts U 's login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } transmitted between U and S and makes use of stolen (ID U , r s 1 ) to calculate K" = h 2 (ID U ||r s 1 ) and r u P = P 2 ⊕ K".
Step 2: U A chooses a random number r a and calculates r a P and the common session key SK" = r a r u P .
Step 3: U A calculates Q 1 = K" ⊕ r a P and Q 2 = h 2 (K"||r u P ||SK") and transmits the malicious response {Q 1 , Q 2 } to the victim user U .
Step 4: After receiving {Q 1 , Q 2 } from U A , the victim U reveals r a P by computing Q 1 ⊕ K and calculates the session key SK = r u r a P , where K = K" and SK = SK". In addition, U checks if h 2 (K||r u P ||SK ) = Q 2 . If it holds, U convinces that he/she is interacting with a legal S. Then, U calculates the acknowledgement message P 4 = h 2 (K||r a P ||SK ) and transmits it to S.
Step 5: U A intercepts U 's acknowledgement {P 4 } transmitted between U and S. As a result, S is not aware of causing this security problem because it never received the messages from U ,
From the above steps, we conclude that U A not only fooled U into believing the authenticity of U A but also cheated U into believing an insecure session key SK = SK" Finally, Lu et al.'s scheme cannot prevent server impersonation attacks.
Lack of Random Number in Registration Phase
In the end of registration phase of Lu et al.'s scheme, we observe that the U only keeps k U in its memory without storing the secret random number r s1 . Consider that U generates the login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } in Step 1 of authentication and key agreement phase, where P 1 = r s 1 P ⊕ ID U . However, in fact, U cannot calculate (P 1 , K, P 2 , P 3 ) without having the random number r s 1 .
Inefficiency of Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
In authentication and key agreement phase of Lu et al.'s scheme, we observe that their scheme exhibits an inefficiency problem in this phase. Consider that a user U transmits a login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } to S. Then S makes use of all (ID U , r s 1 ) stored in its secret database to verify the authenticity of the authorized identity ID U by computing P 1 ⊕ r s1 P . S first computes all the authorized random number r s1 P stored in its secret database and compares P 1 ⊕ r s1 P with all the authorized identify ID U stored in its secret database. Suppose that S needs to take j milliseconds to compute a P 1 ⊕ r s 1 P and takes k milliseconds to compare a P 1 ⊕ r s 1 P with a ID U . Thus it may take j * k * n milliseconds to confirm that U 's login identity ID U is valid or not, where n is the number of all authorized identities stored in S's secret database. If the number of n is a million identities and there are l registered users send login requests to S simultaneously, S must take j * k * l * n milliseconds to confirm them and maybe the login user needs to wait a few minutes for a response message from S. In practice, it exhibits an inefficiency problem in the authentication process and it becomes infeasible for users to wait for the respondent results for such long time in mobile networks. To repair this flaw, we will propose an improved scheme to decrease the waiting time for access S and ensure a high rate of efficiency in the authentication procedures.
In this section, we propose a simple improvement on Lu et al.'s authentication scheme, in which user anonymity and performance efficiency are preserve and stolen-verifier attacks are obviated in the improved scheme. Figure 2 shows the entire schematic of our enhanced scheme in mobile networks.
Registration Phase
Before registration, the server S publishes {E(a, b) , K S , h 1 (·), h 2 (·)}, where K S = k s × P . The details of registration phase are as follows:
Step 1: U selects his/her identity ID U and transmits it to S through a secure channel. 
If it holds, U keeps (r s 1 , k U ) secretly and releases Q ID U .
Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
Step 1: U chooses a random number r u and calculates 
and transmits the response message {Q 1 , Q 2 } to U through a public channel, where r s 2 is a random number chosen by S.
Step 3: After receiving {Q 1 , Q 2 } from S, U reveals r s2 P by computing Q 1 ⊕ K and calculates the session key SK = r u r s2 P . Then U checks if h 2 (K||k U P ||SK ) = Q 2 . If it holds, U calculates the acknowledgement message P 4 = h 2 (K||r s 2 P ||P 2 ||SK ) and transmits it to S through a public channel.
Step 4: After receiving {P 4 } from U , S checks if h 2 (K ||r s 2 P ||P 2 ||SK) = P 4 . If it holds, S and U successfully achieve mutual authentication and negotiate a common and secure session key SK = SK between them.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our improved scheme and show that it is able to prevent above-mentioned weaknesses in Lu et al.'s scheme. 
Release Q ID U Authentication and Key Agreement Phase:
Retrieve (IDU , rs 1 )
Generate rs 2 Calculate SK = r s 2 r u P
Check if h2(K ||rs 2 P ||P2||SK) = P4 Fig. 2 . The schematic of our improved scheme in mobile networks
Resistance to Stolen-Verifier Attacks
We assume that all the verifier (ID U , r s1 ) stored in S's secret database is compromised by an adversary U A . Moreover, U A could collect U 's login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } transmitted between U and S. In the authentication and key agreement phase of our improved scheme, U 's real identity ID U is embedded in the encrypted message P 1 = r u K S ⊕ID U and ID U is well-protected via r u K S . Without knowing the knowledge of U 's random number r u , r u could not be calculated by U A due to the infeasibility of deriving r u from r u K S by solving elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). In addition, without knowing the knowledge of S's private key k s , U A could not compute k s r u P from P 2 . As a result, U A could not successfully derive ID U from P 1 by computing ID U = P 1 ⊕ k s P 2 and the stolen-verifier attack is prevented in the improved scheme.
Resistance to Server Impersonation Attacks
Here, we analyze why our improved scheme can withstand our server impersonation attacks in Section 3.3. In
Step 2 of authentication and key agreement phase of the improved scheme, U A needs to response Q 1 = K" ⊕ r a P and
to the user for verification, where r a is a random number chosen by U A and the forged session key SK" = r a r u P . However, without knowing U 's secret parameter Q ID U = h 1 (ID U ⊕ k s )P , it is computational infeasible for U A to generate a correct Q 2 . As a result, U A could not impersonate as a legal server to response a correct Q 2 to convince the user and we prove the improved scheme is robust against server impersonation attacks.
Resistance to User Impersonation Attacks
Continued to the stolen-verifier attacks, once user's verifier (ID U , r s 1 ) is compromised by U A , he/she may use it to impersonate as a legal U to log into S. However, in Step 1 of authentication and key agreement phase of the improved scheme, U A needs to generate a valid login request
, P 2 = r a P and P 3 = h 2 (K"||r a P ||k U P ) to the server for verification, where r a is a random number chosen by U A and the secret parameter K" is legal one. However, without knowing U 's another secret parameter k U P = r s 1 Q ID U , it is computational infeasible for U A to forge a correct P 3 . Although the login parameters P 1 and P 2 are successfully forged, U A could not forge a correct login parameter P 3 to convince the server. Finally, the improved authentication scheme is secure against user impersonation attacks.
Resistance to Replay Attacks
In the authentication and key agreement phase of the improved scheme, since the transmitted messages {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 } and {Q 1 , Q 2 } contains freshly generated random numbers r u and r s2 . Therefore, U and S could check the freshness of random numbers received and verifies whether these the same as random numbers present in transmitted messages. Finally, this design discards the possibility of replay attacks in our improved scheme.
Provision of User Anonymity
Based on the design of our improved scheme, the property of user anonymity can be ensured in authentication and key agreement phase. We cleverly mask the real identity of U via a public channel and the adversary U A could not compromise U 's real identity ID U by launching security attacks. First, in authentication and key agreement phase, U 's real identity is included in P 1 = r u K S ⊕ ID U and P 3 = h 2 (K||P 2 ||k U P ), where K = h 2 (ID U ||r s1 ). Thus U A cannot reveal ID U without knowing r u . In addition, we assume that the secret parameter r s1 is compromised by U A . Thus U A could guess a candidate ID U and compute K = h 2 (ID U ||r s 1 ). However, U A could not verify the validity of K from P 3 without knowing k U , where k U = r s 1 h 1 (ID u ⊕k s ) . That is to say, all the identities are transmitted in cipher format instead of plaintext and these random numbers will be randomized at each new session. Finally, the property of user anonymity can be guaranteed in our improved scheme.
Provision of Mutual Authentication
In authentication and key agreement phase of the improved scheme, only the legitimate user can know the secret parameters (r s1 , K, k U to generate a legal login request {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 }. Therefore, in Step 2 of this phase, S can authenticate U by checking if the computed h 2 (K ||P 2 ||r s 1 Q ID U ) is equal to the received P 3 . Moreover, in Step 3 of this phase, only the legal server S can embed U 's secret parameter k U into Q 2 , where
As a result, U can authenticate S by computing h 2 (K||k U P ||SK ) and checking if the secret parameter k U P is involved in Q 2 . Finally, the property of mutual authentication is satisfied in the improved scheme.
Provision of Session Key Security
Since the common session key SK is only shared and established among the user U and the server S. In order to establish a secure and authenticated channel for late successive transmission, the session key SK not only ensures confidentiality but also achieves authenticity of participants and messages. Based on the design of session key SK = r s2 r u P = r u r s2 P = SK , where r u and r s2 are used for preventing possible replay attacks. Moreover, due to the protection of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem, the adversary U A could not derive the session key SK = SK by collecting r u P and r s 2 P . Finally, the excellent properties of session key security and data confidentiality can be guaranteed in our improved authentication scheme.
Formal Security Proof
In this section, we adopt the formal tool to analyze the security of the session key between user U and server S namely BAN logic [1] . Some notations used in BAN logic analysis are described as follows:
-A | ≡ X: It means that A believes the formula X is true.
-A X: It means that A sees the formula X. -A | ⇒ X: It means that A has complete control over the formula X.
-A | ∼ X: It means that A has once said the formula X.
-(X): It means that X is fresh. The formula X has not been used before or X is a nonce.
It means that principals A and B may use the shared key K to communicate. Note that K will never be discovered by any principals except A and B. -< X > Y : It means that formula X is combined with a secret parameter Y .
-(X) K : It means that formula X is hashed with a key K. In order to describe logical postulates of BAN logic in formal terms, we list four rules as follows:
(Rule 1) Message meaning rule:
If A believes that K is shared with B and sees X hashed with K, then A believes that B once said X.
(Rule 2) Nonce verification rule:
If A believes that X has been uttered recently (freshness) and A believes that B once said X, and then A believes that B believes X.
(Rule 3) The jurisdiction rule:
If A believes that B has jurisdiction over X, and A believes that B believes a message X, then A believes X.
(Rule 4) The freshness conjuncatenation rule:
If one part known to be fresh, then the entire formula is fresh.
According to the analytic procedures of BAN logic, two participators U and S cooperatively run the improved scheme and we list the verification goals of our scheme as follows:
Next, we use BAN logic to transform our scheme, illustrated in Figure 2 into the idealized form. The scheme generic types are shown in the following:
Idealize form of the proposed scheme:
To analyze the proposed scheme, the following assumptions are also required:
Based on the above-mentioned assumptions, the preliminary procedures of BAN logic are well prepared and we show the main steps of the verification proof as follows:
Experiment Result
To demonstrate the efficiency, we show the experiment results of our improved scheme and compare it with Lu et al.'s authentication scheme [20] in terms of computational overhead. For example in our experimental environment (Pentium IV 3.2 GHz CPU and 6.0 GB RAM), we have run thousand rounds to take the arithmetic mean. The outcome showed that the average time of performing a one-way hash function and an elliptic curve point multiplication are approximately 0.01 ms and 1.15 ms, respectively. Here, we neglect the computational overhead for XOR and concatenate operations, we only consider one-way hash function and elliptic curve point multiplication in our experiment and performance comparisons are done only for authentication and key agreement phase because this phase is frequently executed. According to the computational time of Lu et al.'s scheme and our improved scheme, we can get the performance comparisons as shown in Figure 3 . On the sides of mobile user and remote server, the computational time of all these two authentication schemes are approximately identical for one communication session when the total number of registered user stored in the server is only one. As illustrated in Figure 3 , we learn that our improved scheme executes only 8 one-way hashing operations and 8 elliptic curve point multiplication operations and takes 9.23 ms a session on average, without respect to total numbers of registered users stored in remote server side. Additionally, for performing an authentication session, Lu et al.'s scheme requires much more computational time especially for scenarios of increasingly registered users stored in remote server side. From the implementation point of view, our improved scheme requires less computational cost compared with Lu et al.'s scheme and the feature of performance efficiency makes our new scheme more suitable for implementation in mobile communication networks.
Conclusions
In this study, we have analyzed the security aspects of Lu et al.'s mutual authentication and key agreement scheme with user anonymity for mobile networks. However, we have demonstrated that Lu et al.'s authentication scheme has redundancy in protocol design and still failed to preserve user anonymity. Moreover, we have presented that their authentication scheme is susceptible to server impersonation attacks while having a problem of stolen-verifier in remote server side. To address these design weaknesses, we present an improved scheme and demonstrate the robustness of our improved scheme through BAN logic. According to the formal verification and experimental comparison, our improved scheme has protected network security during the service delivery session and has less computational overhead compared with Lu et al.'s authentication scheme.
